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INTRODUCTION, OBJECTIVES, AND PROCEDURE
Introduction
Competition is the key to a free enterprise business system.
Competition breeds improvement; a company must constantly strive
to better its competitors or face the consequences. With tight
market conditions some businesses will ultimately not succeed or
continue operations.
The prospect of business failure is not a topic most
businesses care to acknowledge. In construction however, failure
is a real possibility and the possibility, as will be shown, has
increased tremendously in the recent past.
The conditions which result in company failure and the
economic conditions which increase the likelihood of failure are
therefore legitimate areas of study. Understanding the mechanism
of failure is key to attempting to avoid failure. Corrective
action can not be taken if trouble is not acknowledged or
foreseen.
To many failure in business equates to bankruptcy.
Bankruptcy can be viewed as society's means of acknowledging the
inevitability of failure and of the need to equitably handle all
concerns involved in the failure. Creditors must be paid in an
equitable manner, and the fate of the debtor must be handled
equitably. Above all bankruptcy is a legal process with clear

and distinct guidelines established in law. The terms bankruptcy
and bankrupt should only apply to firms which have, either
voluntarily or involuntarily, entered their fate into the
bankruptcy court system.
The term failure in the business world can also be used in a
sense which does not equate with bankruptcy. Failure can be
viewed as the lack of success. In this case failure would mean
the inability of a company to realize returns on investments
equal to or greater than returns which could have been obtained
from other sources. For this paper failure will be viewed in the
bankruptcy sense or as ceasing to continue and being unable to
fully pay all creditors.
A term with is essential when discussing bankruptcy and
failure is insolvency. Insolvency occurs when liabilities exceed
assets. This can be a temporary condition as when current assets
do not meet current liabilities. Technical insolvency is the
term used for this situation. A more serious condition is when
total liabilities exceed the fair value of total assets. (Altman
1971) Under this insolvency the company is unable to satisfy all
debts. This is certainly the main trigger for bankruptcy.
Business bankruptcy has lost some of the stigma once
attached to it. Perhaps this is because of the increased number
of business who use this route to exit the business world. It
may also be due to a realization that in competitive changing
marketplaces failure will occur. Understanding and studying
bankruptcy and failure in the construction industry however, may

assist construction companies from being forced to take that
route.
Background
Unlike the study of how to succeed in business, the study of
business bankruptcy has not been given much attention. This is
particularly true for the construction industry in the United
States. No comprehensive study into the causes of bankruptcy for
construction companies or of bankruptcy in the construction
industry has been completed.
The study of bankruptcy in other areas has been performed.
Models to predict the bankruptcy tendency of companies have been
developed for other industries and for various company sizes.
This procedure has not been applied to U.S. construction
companies however.
Statistics on bankruptcies are maintained by the U.S.
Bankruptcy Court system however the statistics are not broken
down into areas like construction. The largest source of
information on failures in the construction industry is Dun and
Bradstreet Corp. Dun and Bradstreet is a private corporation
which maintain a database on various aspects of the business
world. It publishes some of this database in various forms
including failures in the construction industry.

Objectives
The purpose of this paper is to explore a unique aspect of
the construction business environment, bankruptcy and business
failure. The increasing number of business failures in
construction makes the understanding of this issues critical.
This paper is designed to give the reader an overview of the
legal aspects of bankruptcy. A brief history of the laws
pertaining to bankruptcy is provided to give the reader an
understanding of the changes which have occurred in the benefits
of bankruptcy.
The reasons why a company may become placed in a situation
of possible failure are presented to give insight into the
actions which are necessary to minimize the risk of failure. The
paper studies the prediction of business failure from both the
standpoint of macro-economic factors as well as from economic
factors of individual companies. Ten years of applicable data is
used to analyze the prediction of business failure probability in
the construction industry. The goal is to establish a means for
defining the impact external factors have on construction
failures so companies can monitor the factors and hopefully avoid




This paper presents the fluctuation of the probability of
failure for construction companies over the period 1978-1986.
The possible causes of the changes which have occurred in this
item are presented and analyzed. Empirical relationships between
variables which possibly cause changes in failure probability are
made.
Mathematical modeling techniques are used to verify
empirical findings and to obtain a method to predict future
changes in the rate of failure for construction companies. The
limitations of the model are explored including the possible
effects of bankruptcy law changes.
The applicability to construction companies of models
developed to predict failure prospects of individual companies is
investigated. These models were developed for companies
unrelated to construction. Within the limitations of data




HISTORY AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF BANKRUPTCY
Philosophy
Businesses exist in an ever-changing environment, an
environment whose conditions can rapidly change from favorable
to unfavorable. The business world is one with inherent risks
and dangers. Businesses are constantly challenged by its
competitors and its operating economy. Each business approaches
similar conditions differently and with varying results. Each
however must meet changing conditions to maintain profitability
and succeed in the business world. However not all businesses
can succeed. (Nelson 1981)
In business competition new businesses continue to be formed
and some businesses will ultimately cease to exist. A business
can end for a number of reasons, however, a greater and greater
number of businesses are stopping operation through the legal
means of bankruptcy.
With the inevitability of business failure it is essential
that a standardized means of dissolving or handling the failed
business be established. Bankruptcy serves this purpose.
Bankruptcy is society's means of minimizing the costs and effects
of business failure. Ultimately bankruptcy is a legal process
which must equitably satisfy the needs of a companies creditors
as well as the companies owners. It must clearly establish the

rules for determining which creditors will get what and determine
the fate of the debtor. (Altman 1971)
The failure of a business without set guidelines to orderly
disestablish the business would lead to a chaotic economic
system. The rights of all interested parties would not be known
nor necessarily be protected.
In its attempt to be equitable, bankruptcy law allows for
two separate means of handling unproductive establishments. The
law provides for the orderly liquidation of business assets or
when applicable provides guidelines for giving a debtor business
time and direction to become productive again. The theory behind
reorganization is that if the businesses economic value is
greater in a new reorganized capacity then the value of its
liquidated assets, the company should not be liquidated.
Alternatively if the company's prospects in any reorganized state
are not positive then it is better for society to require
liquidation. Part of the bankruptcy process is to make this
determination
.
Bankruptcy may be entered in one of two manners: either
voluntarily or involuntarily. As the names suggest voluntary
bankruptcy is with the approval of the debtor company. In some
cases however the debtor is reluctant to enter bankruptcy but
because of its financial condition should. In these cases
creditors of the debtor can enter an involuntary bankruptcy in an
attempt to minimize their losses. Both the liquidation vs.
reorganization and voluntary vs. involuntary issues are clarified

in bankruptcy law. It is important to have a general knowledge
of bankruptcy law to fully understand bankruptcy's impact and
significance.
History and Overview of Bankruptcy Law
It has been shown that bankruptcy fulfills a great purpose
in the economic system of a society. It allow for the orderly
and equitable handling of a business unable to cope with its
debts. The need for bankruptcy provisions in a society are well
established. In the United States the Constitution specifically
empowers the Congress with enacting bankruptcy laws. (Stanley and
Girth 1971)
The focus of bankruptcy law has changed substantially over
time. The theory of debtor's prisons and holding individuals
criminally accountable for unpaid debts no longer holds. The
philosophical change can be viewed as a realization that economic
conditions vary and in order to promote growth risks must be
encouraged. Consequently businesses are not necessarily grossly
incompetent for going bankrupt. They may have existed in an
unfavorable environment which lead to their demise. In addition
if penalties for assuming business risks are too great, business-
es will not take the risks necessary to make an economy flourish.
The first substantial and lasting bankruptcy law enacted by
Congress was the Bankruptcy Act of 1893. This act clearly
focused on the disestablishment of businesses through liquida-
8

tion. The act did not formally acknowledge reorganization. A
company however, could attempt to remain in existence through an
equity receivership. Equity receiverships were developed to
prevent harmful seizures of property by unsatisfied creditors
through liens. This was done by having court appointed receivers
manage corporate assets. They proved however, to be time
consuming, costly, and susceptible to unjust settlements. (Altman
1983)
The first major amendment of the 1893 act was the Chandler
Act of 1938. In addition to being more comprehensive, this act
clearly established the philosophy of business reorganization as
an alternative to full liquidation. The act consisted of 14
chapters of which both Chapters X and XI dealt with business
reorganization. Chapter X was for publicly held corporations and
those with secured creditors. A Chapter X case could be filed
voluntarily or involuntarily by creditors with total claims
exceeding $5,000. Chapter XI dealt with smaller firms with no
secured creditors and could only be entered into voluntarily.
Chapter X cases automatically resulted in the appointment of an
independent trustee to control the company during reorganization.
Under a Chapter XI filing the owners of the bankrupt firm usually
remained in control during reorganization proceedings.
Both Chapter X and Chapter XI cases required the formulation
of a reorganization plan. This plan developed by input from
owners, creditors, and trustees would outline the steps to be
taken to turn the bankrupt business into a successful one.

The reorganization plan had to be approved by the court and
by a percentage of the creditors. Once ratified the plan became
binding on all creditors.
Liquidation under the 1938 act was termed straight bankrupt-
cy. The act established clear guidelines for the priority of
payment to creditors. Under the act all creditors in a certain
category had to be paid in full before the next lower category of
creditors could be paid anything. (Altman 1983)
The most recent bankruptcy law is the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978. The new act mainly revises the administrative proce-
dures behind bankruptcy allowing them to better fit the character
of the increased number of filings being experienced. A large
change under the new act is the combining of all reorganization
(including old Chapter X and XI filings) into one chapter,
Chapter 11. Under Chapter 11 automatic appointment of a trustee
no longer exists. A trustee for the period of reorganization is
mainly reserved for cases in which fraud or some other illegal
activity is suspected. This change may dishearten creditors who
have little faith in existing management but is designed to speed
up the process of bankruptcy.
Chapter 11 also allows involuntary filings in cases which
would have not been allow under the old Chapter XI. This change
is included to help eliminate the prospect of a company attempt-
ing to stay alive while it is only causing further economic
damage. Creditors can now file the bankruptcy charges before
their loses become unmanageable.
10

Chapter 11 holds intact the concept of filing a
reorganization plan intact. Under the new act however, creditors
are given more input. Under the old Chapter XI only debtors
could file a plan. Now creditors can file their own plan for the
troubled company after a specified period of time. (Nelson 1981)
The new code also clarifies the rights of and protections
for the debtor. Basically it stops all collective efforts of
creditors and forces all debts owed into the bankruptcy proceed-
ings. The term used for this action is automatic stay. An
automatic stay gives the debtor the time to formulate a reorgani-
zation or repayment plan without fear of harassment or foreclo-
sure. Ultimately automatic stays may lead to a relieving of the
financial debts that forced the bankruptcy depending on the
outcome of the reorganization plan. (Altman 1983)
Priority of payment is another concept which remains under
the 1978 act. Some changes were made to the hierarchy of
priority however. To assist in the probability of passing a
reorganization plan by creditors, a reorganization plan may call
for some payment to a lower level creditor before the higher
creditor is paid in full. This procedure speeds up the bankrupt-
cy process and possibly ends in a more equitable solution. The
priority of claims in the new law are:
1) Administrative expenses of the bankruptcy, such as
legal, accounting fees and trustee fees.




3) Unsecured claims for wages, salaries or benefits
earned within 90 days before filing.
4) Unsecured claims to individuals up to $900 arising
from the deposit of money before bankruptcy in connection with
the future use of goods or services of the debtor.
5) Unsecured claims of governmental units including all
taxes.
6) Secured debts, that is debts having specific assets
as collateral, have priority on the funds received from the
liquidation of that asset and priority over remaining unsecured
debts.
7) Senior debts spelled out in loan agreements.
8) Remaining unsecured claims.
9) Equity holders in the firm i.e. preferred and common
stock holders in that order. These individuals should not
receive any payment or securities in the new firm if the value of
the firm's asset is less than the claims. (Altman 1983)
Liquidations follow these priorities more rigorously since
there is no reorganization plan. Under the new act business
liquidations are no longer termed straight bankruptcies. They
are rather referred to by the chapter which covers them. Chapter
7.
As can be seen from this overview of bankruptcy law there
are some scenarios where it is advantageous for a troubled
company to seek bankruptcy protections. The company can obtain
relief from debt through liquidation or can even possibly
12

reorganize and emerge from bankruptcy a stronger, more prosperous
entity. Under reorganization debts are handled under a court
approved reorganization plan which may also contain some relief
from burdensome debt.
Protections granted under the new Chapter 11 are
significant. The priciple of automatic stay guarantees a debtor
freedom from individual collection effort by various creditors.
Lumping all debts into bankruptcy hearings allows the debtor the
possibility of complete freedom from all debts and continued
operation if the court agrees to reorganization. The fact that
trustees are no longer routinely appointed for Chapter 11 filings
is also a benefit to the bankrupt company. Greater latitude in
the direction the company will take is maintained by company
management.
It can be seen that the laws governing Chapter 11
reorganizations are more advantageous to the bankrupt company
than the provisions which governed the old Chapter X or XI cases.
There is a greater prospect that the company requesting
reorganization will not only get relief from debt but also
reemerge in a form that is more competitive. In fact
construction companies are using this route to void labor
agreements which management feels are hampering their ability to
make profits. By declaring bankruptcy and requesting
reorganization labor agreements may be nullified under
reorganization plans. (ENR 1983)
This helps explain why a company may seek bankruptcy. The
13

reasons for the need to study bankruptcy and specifically
bankruptcy in the construction industry are derived from other
issues.
Why Study Bankruptcy in the Construction Industry
Although sometimes a topic which most businesses would
rather not think about, the study of bankruptcy especially in
recent times is an essential topic. For reasons which will be
explored later in this paper the number of business bankruptcies
has soared in the recent past. Figure 2.1 gives an indication of
the growth in the number of business bankruptcies according to
the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts, Administrative Office of the
President, Table of Bankruptcy Statistics, 1980. It is important
to note that the court system does not segregate statistics by
specific industries. Therefore data specifically on construction
bankruptcies is not available. The trend of total business
bankruptcies however approximate construction bankruptcy trends.
A second source of information concerning business failures
is through Dun and Bradstreet Corporation. Dun and Bradstreet
(D&B) is a private corporation which keeps statistics on
numerous aspects of American and worldwide business. One aspect
which D&B keeps statistics on is business failure. It must be
kept in mind however that D&B's definition of a business failure
does not necessarily equate to bankruptcy. A business failure is































assignment or bankruptcy; ceased operation with losses to
creditors after such actions as foreclosure or attachment;
voluntarily withdrew leaving unpaid debts; were involved in court
actions such as receivership, reorganization of arrangement; or
voluntarily compromised with creditors." (D&B Business Failure
Record 1986)
Failures according to D&B by definition will not equal
either the number of bankruptcies nor the number of businesses
which cease operation. A failure will not be assessed to a
company which decides to close its doors but is able to pay its
creditors in full. In addition a failure may be assessed even if
a formal court proceeding is not entered into.
D&B' total number of failures will not compare to court
statistics for another reason. D&B does not keep statistics on
all forms of business. Specifically railroads, financial
institutions, real estate companies and some small service firms
are not included in D&B's statistics. D&B however does keep
specific track of various categories of business including
construction. D&B's statistics will therefore be used throughout
this paper as the indicator of failures in the construction
world. Included in D&B's construction section are subsections
for general contractors and operative builders, construction
other than buildings, and special trade contractors. Figure 2-2
shows the total number of failures in construction related fields
according to D&B. This figure clearly supports the notion that












































critical area of study.
The great impact of bankruptcy or business failure on all
facets of the construction industry increases the importance of
this area of study. While the impact on the business having
financial trouble is obvious, the impact on owners, subcontracto-
rs, is just as critical.
An owner's objectives in a construction project can be
summarized by his desire to obtain quality work for an inexpen-
sive price in a timely manner. All of these areas are affected
when a contractor is faced with bankruptcy. The most obvious
impact is the increased urgency of cost issues to the contractor.
The need to save money can first show in cutting corners in the
performance of a job. Quality becomes secondary to minimizing
costs.
The likelihood of additional and perhaps frivolous claims or
change order requests also increases. The disincentives of
confrontation with the owner can be outweighed by the desperation
of the contractor. The need to maintain a good rapport with the
owner and possible legal battles do not seem as important to a
troubled contractor as to a financially fit one.
Another manifestation of impending bankruptcy is the desire
to overbill for work completed. While the incentive for this
always exists, it is compounded in the case of a troubled
contractor. Not only is the contractor's need for money greater
but the possible implications to the owner are greater. Since
the prospect of a troubled contractor not completing contractual
18

obligations is greater than normal, an owner who has paid the
contractor more than the value of work completed may very likely
be left with uncompleted work and insufficient funds to complete
the work.
Bankruptcy does not only affect the financial aspects of a
project but it also affects the timeliness of the project as
well. Delays can be caused to the project even if the contractor
has not entered into the lengthy process of bankruptcy. A
contractor in difficulty and unable to keep pace with incoming
bills will lose his credit standing with his suppliers and
subcontractors. The troubled contractor will become unable to
obtain necessary material and equipment unless these items can be
paid for in cash.
The possible implication of a troubled contractor to an
owner are severe. An informed owner however can minimize these
possible effects with a properly worded contract. Bankruptcy law
limits the right of the owner to terminate a contract solely on
the basis of bankruptcy. (ABA 1983) A carefully worded clause in
a contract's General Provisions stating the owners right to
terminate the contract based on nonperformance will give the
owner the flexibility to terminate the contract if it is not
progressing in a timely manner. In association with a
termination clause must be a clause allowing the owner the right
to complete unfinished work using means other than the original
contractor.
A second area in which the owner must protect himself is
19

concerning payments. A clause requiring the contractor to
certify there are no liens against him before progress payments
are made will perform a couple of functions. First it indicates
the contractor is not in severe financial trouble and it also
helps ensure funds are flowing to his subcontractors and suppli-
ers.
Two final areas which can be utilized by an owner are the
use of bonds and retention. Payment and performance bonds can be
essential in guarding against problems from bankruptcy. Not only
do they assist the owner if bankruptcy occurs, they also guard
against getting a contractor who is financially troubled. A
financially troubled contractor most likely will be unable to
secure the required bonds. Holding funds in retention as well as
bonds can help ensure a project will be completed if bankruptcy
occurs. Retention will guard against overpayment and will build
a fund capable of getting a new contractor to complete the job if
the initial contractor fails. A severe retention policy however
can cause a borderline contractor to cross the line into
bankruptcy.
Not only does bankruptcy affect owners but it also impacts
all tiers of subcontractors and suppliers. The main difficulty
encountered by subs and suppliers is obtaining payment for past
performance. The difficulty is rooted in the concept of automa-
tic stay described earlier. Basically the request for payment
becomes entangled in the whole set of debts owed by the bankrupt
contractor. The payment therefore will not be settled until
20

court hearings are concluded. Even then the creditor may not
obtain full payment because of the rules governing allocation of
assets.
The subcontractor or supplier does have some remedies to the
situation. Bankruptcy law does allow the subcontractor or
supplier to refuse to perform for a contractor once he is
insolvent. In addition goods delivered after insolvency may be
recovered. (ABA 1983) If the goods are delivered prior to filing
for bankruptcy they are covered under automatic stay rules.
Payment for services can be attempted to be collected under
another means. This would be through the use of a mechanic's
lien against the owner. A move of this nature may have uncertain
results. An owner can argue that the use of the mechanic's lien
is an act to collect against a debt prior to bankruptcy and
therefore it should be covered under automatic stay provisions
even though the action is against the owner. (ABA 1983)
It can be seen that the possibility of bankruptcy has severe
implications to owners, subcontractors and suppliers. A trouble
contractor can use the threat of bankruptcy to his advantage.
Bankruptcy is viewed by owners as an act which will cause great
delays, and lead to uncertain project results. Concessions can
be sought by the contractor form the owner to avert possible
bankruptcy. Lax contract interpretation and more favorable
payment schedules are two areas which could greatly help a
troubled contractor. The contractor may also seek more favorable
payment schedules for financial institutions, subcontractors, and
21






CAUSES OF BUSINESS FAILURES IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
The Difficulty in Assigning a Cause
In Chapter 2 it was shown that business bankruptcies and
construction industry business failures are on the rise. The
study of this trend relies on the factors which cause a business
to fail. What causes some businesses to thrive in a given
environment while others fail? What are the underlying
mechanisms which can be used to explain this trend? This chapter
will explore these issues.
To study the causes of business failures it is important to
clearly understand a business 's working environment. A
business 's environment can be viewed as a product of external
factors (its marketplace, its competitors, the prevailing
economic conditions) and internal forces (its management
philosophy, its financial condition, and its workers) . These
forces are of course not mutually exclusive. What occurs outside
of the business will cause change in the business itself and to
some extent the actions of the business will effect some of its
external environment.
Both the company's external and internal environments play
key roles in the success or failure of that company. A company
with a strong financial and managerial base can possibly overcome
23

difficult economic and market conditions. Conversely a weak
company can prosper in a growing market and a good economy. A
company's condition can therefore be viewed as a combination of
industry conditions and the financial condition of the company.
(Piatt 1985)
It is important to recognize the interrelationship which
exists between these factors. Extended periods of poor market
and economic conditions can turn a financially fit business into
a weak one. Even within the category of internal forces
interrelationship exists. Poor management may lead to poor sales
and poor sales may lead to poor liquidity. The process of
assigning a reason to a given failure is therefore a difficult
one. Since so many factors are related how do you determine the
actual cause?
Even with this problem Dun and Bradstreet maintains
statistics on the causes of business failures they track. The
cause for a failure is determined by the opinion of informed
creditors and information in Dun and Bradstreet (D&B ) reports.
The publication which lists reasons for business failures is the
Business Failure Record. The most recent publication (1986)
segregates the causes of failures into 10 main areas:
1) neglect 6) sales
2) disaster 7) expenses
3) fraud 8) customer
4) economic factors 9) assets
5) experience 10) capital
24

Figure 3 . 1 shows the relative weights of the 10 causes with
some of the lessor causes combined for ease of presentation.
Clearly the most significant failure cause according to the D&B
statistics is economic factors. Within the economic factors
category are five subcategories:
1) bad profits
2) high interest rates
3) loss of market
4) no customer spending
5) no future
Of these five subcategories only one is significant: bad profits.
Bad profits accounts for 74.2% of the failures in the economic
factors category. Since economic factors account for 69.8% of
all failures, alternatively it can be said that bad profits
account for slightly over half of all failures.
Bad profits however is a vague, extremely encompassing term.
Problems in the other three major categories: experience, sales,
and expenses can ultimately lead to bad profits. Classifying a
failure as the result of bad profits therefore may not give a
good indication of underlying problems which caused the profit
problem. D&B's statistics reflect, to a degree, the interaction
between failure causes. The sum of the percentages of all
categories exceeds 100% since some failures are attributed to
more than one cause. The total sum of causes is approximately
110%. The fact that the sum is close to 100% however is an
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failure are not listed.
Although the D&B listings may not be completely
comprehensive, it is an indication of some of the causes
affecting business failure in the construction industry. It
should be noted that D&B's listing does not give credit, in most
cases, to external factors as reasons for failure. Rather it
lists how those market conditions manifest themselves in the
company which failed. D&B's information does suggest the
following areas are important causes to business failure in the
construction industry:
1) bad profits
2) management incompetence and lack of experience
3) inadequate sales
4) loss of market and economic decline
5) difficulty collecting from customers.
Again this list is intertwined. The difference between belonging
in one as opposed to another is slim. Also it is almost
exclusively tied to company issues not overall economic
conditions. Overall economic issues do however influence a
companies financial stability and these factors will be
investigated in the next section.
Market and Macro-Economic Factors
The economic system in which a business exists can do much
to determine the fate of that business. Whether it is the market
27

competition which the business faces, the cost to borrow money,
or the increase in the cost of goods and services, a business can
not control the overall framework in which it must operate.
Perhaps the most significant item in this category is the
interest rates which a business must pay to borrow money.
The importance of interest rates is derived not only because
of its possible impact on a business but also because of their
variability. Indeed if interest rates remained constant with
time, costs associated with borrowing money would be
inconsequential. Businesses could easily factor the cost into
their cost of doing business and no problems would occur. It is
because interest rates fluctuate that businesses must assume risk
due to borrowing money.
Companies forced to borrow money at a higher rate than those
who had borrowed money at a different time are at a distinct
disadvantage in competition with the other firm. Companies must
therefore be adept at foreseeing market changes. Insight into
when to borrow money is a prime advantage.
Although construction related firms do not have the capital
investment of other industries like manufacturing, the concept of
borrowing money cheaply is critical to construction companies.
Most projects require a substantial amount of capital before the
project can be started. Materials, land , and equipment must be
procured in most cases before any funds are received from an
owner or client. Due to retention the money received from an
owner generally will not equal the money expended on a project
28

until late in that project. This of course requires contractor
funds (in most cases borrowed) to compensate for the difference.
The ability to borrow money at a low rate may make the difference
between not only making money but also getting the job in the
first place.
The whole issue of when to borrow money, and for how long to
borrow it, bring a substantial amount of risk into a project.
Businesses are faced with the decision of borrowing money over a
short period or a long period. Predicting whether the rates will
rise at the end of a short period is key to determining the
correct length of the loan. Failing to guess correctly may
result in having to borrow money later at a higher rate which can
ruin expected profits.
A related issue to interest rates is inflation. Inflation
is important for two reasons. First it is a key indicator of
interest rates. As inflation increases interest rates will
follow. Second it can cause direct losses to a business if the
business does not account for it properly. In a fixed price
situation, a contractor can be responsible for price increases
which could substantially erode profits. The possibility of this
situation is minimized however, by the policy of getting firm
fixed price quotes before bidding.
Another key external force which could determine the success
or failure of a company is reacting to market conditions. A
business must always be aware of who its potential customers are,
what type of business activity can be expected in that market,
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and whether a shift in market potential is expected.
Needs for services and goods constantly change. For a
business to survive it must anticipate these changes and react to
them before its too late. What is popular and in need today may
not be tomorrow.
A prime example of this in the construction world can be
seen in heavy/horizontal construction. In the recent past new
highways were being built at an astonishing rate. Largely due to
federal funding, the need for new road construction caused the
prospect for work in that area to be great. The trend however
had to peak and decline. Now the emphasis is clearly on road
maintenance, repair, and rehabilitation. Companies which can
foresee these changes, monitor applicable trends, and react to
new trends are at a great advantage.
A final aspect of external forces on a company is related
to the market competition which it faces. A method of viewing
this issue is by examining the number of businesses in a given
field. Certainly for a given volume of work if the number of
businesses in that area increases, competition for the work
increases. In addition the prospect of failure increases.
Companies must lower their profit expectations just to stay in
the market.
New businesses entering a market not only increase the
likelihood of failure through competition, but also their very
nature increases the possibility of failure. New businesses are
very unstable. They don't possess some of the characteristics
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that allow established businesses to weather financial hardships.
New businesses in general do not have equity built to a point
where if a problem occurs they can take losses and still survive.
On the contrary, due to their riskiness, new businesses are less
likely to secure loans capable of sustaining them through the
hardship.
In addition to financial instability, new businesses lack
the experience of older firms. Referring back to figure 3.1 it
is clear that lack of experience is a key cause of business
failure. Experience problems can be tied to different areas. In
construction the company must not only be technically competent
but also financially competent. A business which understands the
trade of construction well but does not understand how to manage
money will experience difficulty and vice versa.
Internal Factors Which Can Cause Failure
The external forces mentioned in the previous section will
ultimately manifest themselves in some internal aspect of a
business. Profits, current assets, and total revenues are some
of the areas which can be affected by those issues. However in
addition to forces external to a company, there are items over
which the company has control which can produce effects which
determine whether or not that company survives. These can be
viewed as internal forces.
Prime among this category is having a poor cash-flow cycle.
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This area relates to the issue of interest rates mentioned
previously. A company however should have some control over when
it receives a certain payment for work completed. Keeping a
handle on accounts receivable, making sure invoices are submitted
promptly and paid promptly can clearly reduce interest payments
on borrowed money. If necessary, front-end loading a project's
payment schedule can be done to minimize the difference between
money expended and money owed.
It should be realized that a business does not have complete
control over this matter. Late payment by an owner is not
something done by the efforts of the contractor. Monitoring and
managing the cash-flow cycle however can be done. In fact if it
isn't done an no attempt is made to minimize the time between
work performance and payment, the contractor can clearly be
losing possible profits.
A second area which is under the control of the business, is
properly using assets. This area has two extremes, both of which
are potentially damaging.
Placing all resources of a company in assets which are not
liquid can accelerate the growth of the company but can also lead
to the dramatic failure of the company. The money made by the
company can be put into materials for another project, equipment,
or office space all of which can help the company grow. However
if money is needed quickly it would not be available until the
assets could be liquidated. A technical insolvency where current
assets do not meet current liabilities could result. On the
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other hand failure to use assets to revitalize and stimulate the
company can cause stagnation and loss of future prospective work.
Company management must weigh the advantages of growth against
the prospect of technical insolvency to determine the proper
balance of asset usage.
Businesses must also make decisions on how to raise the
funds necessary to preform its operations. The choice must be
made between going into debt or increasing equity. Of the two
increasing debt is more risky. Debt has the corresponding
interest payments associated with it. Revenues must be
substantially high as to adequately cover the repayment schedule.
Failure to have sufficient revenue from the debt incurred will
ultimately lead to bankruptcy.
Increasing equity either by increasing owner's equity or
selling stock gives a company more flexibility in repayment.
Choosing this course of action however may decrease owner's
profits and control since they have to be spread over a wider
base.
The costs required to produce the outcome of a business are
perhaps the ultimate area of concern. While construction is
associated with low fixed costs of doing business, operating
leverage or the costs relative to profit for a project are of
concern. Except for the case of heavy construction, equipment
and other fixed costs are low. Most costs are associated with a
specific project. Material, labor, and even equipment rental




Cost control for a job is therefore of prime importance.
Sufficient and timely cost control reports defining budgeted vs.
actual costs are essential for ensuring profitability for a job.
The ability to foresee cost overruns before they become
unmanageable should be the goal of cost control reporting.
Since contractors rely on the same material suppliers and
the same rental companies, the cost of labor and the method of
operation are sometimes the only differences between the costs of
contractors. Labor productivity and efficient techniques
therefore are two areas which could mean the difference between
success or failure. If a given contractor can do a job quicker
because of better labor productivity or better methods that
contractor will be well employed and profitable.
This chapter has listed several factors involved in
determining whether or not a business will fail. However all of
the areas whether they are external or internal ultimately show
in the company's financial statement. Plain and simple, a
company will succeed if it can make money. The data collected by
Dun and Bradstreet showing poor profits as the prime reason for
failure bears this out.
It is the company's managerial policies and decisions within
the context of its external environment which will cause the
company to make or lose money. Emery Toncre states "The major
difference between a business that survives and one that fails
depends upon how well the business owner has used management
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tools" (Toncre 1984) Perhaps this statement should be
generalized to how well a business owner makes financial
decisions. Dun and Bradstreet ' s data shows that about 80% of all
failures are attributed to financial causes.
A company which does not adequately manage its finances will
ultimately fail economically. This failure may only be
opportunity losses i.e. not meeting profit expectations or
expectations of non-risk investments. The failure may also be
negative profits and ultimately a negative net worth of the




ANALYSIS OF BUSINESS FAILURE RATE FOR CONSTRUCTION
Introduction to Construction Failure Rate
Chapter 3 investigated some of the causes of business
failure in the construction industry. For the study of the
causes to be significant they must ultimately effect the pattern
of business failure. This chapter will analyze the relationship
of various causes of business failure and failure statistics.
Chapter 5 will then take this process one step further and
investigate the applicability of modeling business failure based
on relationships discussed in this chapter.
The key indicator of business failure activity discussed so
far has been Dun and Bradstreet's listing of total yearly
failures in the construction industry. Figure 2.2 showed the
change in this indicator over the period 1977-1986. The use of
this statistic to define and analyze the state of business
failure in the construction industry may be inaccurate. Since
the measurement is only of the number of failures, the statistic
does not take into account the size of the pool from which the
number of failures is taken.
This may be misleading for the following reason. If the
number of active construction companies increases significantly
over time, the number of companies failing may also increase over
the same period although the condition of the construction
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industry may be stable or even better. Looking at the total
number of failures without relating it to the number of possible
failures therefore does not give a complete indication of the
status of the construction industry and the possibility of
failure for construction companies.
A more accurate indicator of the relative health of the
construction industry and of failure tendency is the business
failure rate. Dun and Bradstreet has routinely published failure
rates for the cumulative total of the businesses it lists. The
failure rate strictly for construction has only been published
starting in 1984. Due to the importance of how this statistic
has changed over time it is essential to find a method of
calculating it.
Dun and Bradstreet in addition to maintaining failure
statistics also maintains a listing of the number of active firms
in different industrial categories for the previous year. These
figures are published in Dun and Bradstreet • s "Census of American
Business". The complete pool of businesses analyzed to obtain
the number of yearly failures is given in the section listing
number of firms by sales volume.
The total number of firms for which construction was their
primary business was obtained from this source. This in
conjunction with the total number of failures was used to
calculate a business failure rate for construction companies. In
accordance with Dun and Bradstreet convention this statistic is
displayed as the number of failures per 10,000 possible firms.
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Figure 4.1 shows the change of business failure rate for
construction companies over the period 1978-1986. Figure 4.2 is
a comparison of the change of total number of failures and the
change in failure rate over the same period. Figure 4.2 uses an
index of 1978=100 to equally compare the two items.
On its own the change in business failure rate for
construction companies demonstrates some interesting
characteristics. Most significantly is the period 1979-1984. In
this five year period the rate of failure soared from 20 per
10,000 (or 0.2%) to 112 per 10,000 (or 1.12%) an increase of
460%. With the exception of 1982-1983 the increase in failure
rate was fairly constant. The period of drastic increase was
preceeded and followed by slight decreases. The decrease from
1984-1986 however, did little to compensate for the previous
increases and the failure rate in 1986 was still over 100 per
10,000 at 107.
Figure 4.2 demonstrates the importance of using failure rate
as an indicator of industry tendency vice total failures.
Although the graph of both statistics are similar in style, the
growth of the failure rate index has not kept pace with the
failure index. This corresponds to the fact that the number of
companies in the construction industry has grown over the period
1978-1986. This growth therefore explains some of the growth in
the number of failures per year. Specifically there were
approximately 544,000 construction related businesses in 1978 and
658,000 in 1986 according to Dun and Bradstreet records.
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The tendency for failure in the construction industry
therefore has not increased as much as plain failure statistics
would suggest. The growth in the number of failures however has
exceeded the growth in the number of companies. This explains
the overall growth of the failure rate over the period of study.
It can be seen that the failure rate for construction
companies was highly volatile during the period 1978-1986. An
interesting comparison to the construction failure rate is the
failure rate for all business tracked by Dun and Bradstreet.
Figure 4.3 compares the failure rates for construction and all
businesses.
The failure rate for construction is fairly consistent with
the failure rate for all businesses. In fact the rate for
construction has in general been slightly less than the total
rate for all concerns. The failure rate for all businesses had
seen a similar jump during the period 1979-1984 as had the rate
for construction. In addition a leveling off period following
the increase occurred. The 1986 rate of failure for all
businesses was 120 per 10,000, a significant amount higher than
the construction rate.
Construction firms therefore are no more susceptible to
business failure than businesses in other industries. In fact
the probability of failure for a construction company in 1986 was
12% less than the average company.
Still the rates of failure experienced in the last couple of
years are the highest since the Great Depression. That fact
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alone signifies the need of study in this area. However in raw
terms the probability of failure for the average construction
company is low. 100 firms per 10,000 equates to a 1% chance of
failing in a given year. The realization that a firm must live
with the chance over its entire life adds to the significance of
rises in the failure rate. In addition the rate is not equal for
all firms. Well established firms intuitively have a much lower
probability of failure than newer firms. This reasoning will be
investigated later in the chapter and leads to significance of
new businesses to the failure rate.
The erratic behavior of the construction failure rate shown
in Figure 4.1 can be related to industry forces which also vary
over time. These industry forces were tied to the causes of
failure in chapter 3 and include:
1) amount of construction activity
2) interest rates
3) inflation
4) new business activity
The changes in these forces, in various forms, can be compared to
failure rate changes to determine their significance and impact.
Construction Activity and Failure Rate
The relationship between construction activity and failure
rate can best be conceptualized through the theory of
competition. When construction activity competition between
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existing businesses increases. Lower profit margins, higher risk
factors, and greater likelihood of negative profits result.
Continued decreases or stagnation in construction activity
should ultimately result in increases in business failure.
Figure 4.4 shows one measure of construction activity, the
construction contract valuation index by F. W. Dodge. The index
with 1977 equal to 100 was obtained from the Department of
Commerce's Survey of Current Business.
The graph shows a clear decline in construction activity
from the period 1979-1982. Following 1982 a steady rise in
activity occurred with the rate of rise gradually decreasing from
1982-1986.
The comparison between the valuation index and construction
failure rate can be made by placing both graphs in index form
with both having 1978=100. Figure 4.5 gives this presentation.
From Figure 4.5 it can be seen that the drop in construction
activity noted during the period 1979-1982 correlates to the
largest rate of increase in the construction failure rate. The
rise in contract value index from 1982-1983 has a corresponding
leveling off in the failure rate. All of this is consistent with
the general relationship that decreases in construction activity
result in failure increases.
The period following 1983 however, is not consistent with
the general relationship. The index for contract value is
increasing from 1983-1986 however the index value for failure

































additional factors to explain the activity of construction
failure rate.
Another key point should be made about the relationship
between the contract value index and the failure rate index as
shown in Figure 4.5. The change in failure rate is clearly more
dramatic and substantial than the change in contract value index.
This indicates that small variations in the value index can have
substantial effects on the failure rate.
Interest Rates and Failure Rate
As mentioned in chapter 3 the implication of changes in the
interest rate which companies borrow money at can severely effect
the profitability of construction companies. The need to borrow
money to commence a project is almost always a fact of life in
construction. Borrowing money cheaply with lower interest
payments reduces the risk of negative profit on a job. The
impact of project delays, and late payments which hurt the cash-
flow cycle becomes less acute with lower interest rates.
Interest rates vary according to location, length of loan,
and credit risk. It is difficult therefore to state a definitive
rate charged to a construction business. The changes in interest
rates however should follow a similar pattern no matter what the
loan characteristics are.
For this paper the measure of interest rates is the federal




























of this loan rate during the period 1978-1986. The substantial
increase of over 80% from the period 1978-1981 is perhaps the
most significant portion of the graph. The implications of this
quick and significant change in the borrowing rate should be
great.
After 1981 a gradual decrease in interest rates occurred
with the exception of a slight increase from 1983 to 1984. The
rate in 1986 however is still 20% higher than the rate in 1978.
To compare the effect of interest rates on construction
failure rate the two values were indexed at 1978=100 so changes
can be viewed on similar scales. Figure 4.7 shows this
comparison
It would be expected that increases in loan rates would
result in corresponding increases in failure rate. This
relationship is evident during the period 1979-1981. However
before that period the relationship does not hold.
This can possibly be due to a time lag between the rise in
loan rates and the rise in failure rate. If the loan rate curve
is shifted one year so that 1987 would be 1979, the relationship
hold for the period 1979-1982.
After 1982 however the lag between the curves does not seem
to hold. Specifically, the period 1984-1986 shows both curves on
slight declines. The prospect of a time lag between changes in
loan rate and changes in failure rate therefore seems uncertain.
While it is logical that it would take a certain period of time











































































graph of the two variables is unclear in determining the
relationship. A possible relationship that increases in loan
rate take a period of time to cause increases in failure rate
while decreases in loan rate almost immediately cause decreases
in failure rate is suggested by the graph. A conclusion about
the relationship would appear to require additional information
however.
The decreases in loan rate from 1984-1986 had corresponding
slight decreases in failure rate. The increases in loan rate on
the other hand had corresponding significant increases in failure
rate. This relationship would seem to suggest the need to
additional forces to explain this lack of decrease in 1984-1986.
In addition the substantial increase of failure rate from 1983-
1984 is unexplained from just loan rates.
Another comparison with failure rate related to interest
rates can be made using mortgage rates. Mortgage rates are
applicable for a couple of reasons. First while they are not
directly involved in interest payment made by contractors, they
are a good indicator of loan interest rate activity. Changes in
mortgage rates are extremely similar to changes in loan interest
rates.
Secondly mortgage rates are an excellent indicator of
residential construction activity. Rises in mortgage rates
inevitably reduce residential construction activity. Residential
construction is a significant portion of work to many of the
companies tracked by Dun and Bradstreet under the heading of
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construction. Therefore changes in residential activity should
effect construction business failures.
Figure 4.8 is a graph of new home, first, conventional,
mortgage rates. As expected the graph is similar to the graph of
loan rates. Significant rises occurred in 1978-1981. Rates were
fairly stable from 1981-1982 and then decreased thereafter to a
point slightly above the rate in 1978.
Figure 4.9 showing mortgage rate vs. failure rate indices
again indicates the possibility of a time lag particularly during
the period 1979-1982. Mortgage rates do not explain the rise in
failure rate from 1983-1984 but do suggest the downward trend
from 1984-1986. However again it would be expected that the
downward trend in mortgage rates would result in a larger
decrease in failure rate.
Construction Cost and Failure Rate
Severe rises in construction cost and overall inflation
related to construction can have an effect on contractor
profitability. Failure to anticipate cost changes and guard
against incurring additional costs can limit chances for success.
Large increases in construction cost could affect construction
failure rates.
As a measure of construction cost, the Department of
Commerce's cost index with 1977=100 was used. Figure 4.10 shows








































































































been from 1978-1980. After 1980 the rise was fairly stable and
moderate.
Again to measure the effect on failure rates the
construction cost index with 1978=100 was graphed against the
failure rate index. Figure 4.11 shows this relationship. From
Figure 4.11 it is difficult to see any clear pattern between the
cost index and failure rate. Some correlation exists with high
cost increases and the high increase in failure rate from 1979-
1981, however a general relationship does not seem to exist. The
use of construction cost as a predictor of failure rate would
seem to be limited.
New Business Activity and Failure Rate
The prospect of failure for a business just starting
operation should be significantly higher than the prospect of
failure for an established business. As explained in chapter 3
the lack of experience and of financial reserves places a new
construction business in a precarious position. The lack of a
reputation and of standard customers adds to the already unstable
condition.
Dun and Bradstreet maintains statistics on the number of
businesses entering the construction field. Figure 4.12 is a
graph of the number of new businesses over time. The definition
of a new business was changed in 1985 so the values of new
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previous years. The trend of the curve however is still valid
and important.
Figure 4.12 reveals some interesting characteristics. The
general downward trend from 1978-1982 should be expected. It was
previously shown that during this period construction activity
was on the decline. In addition interest rates were high and in
general the status of the construction industry was not good. It
is logical that new businesses would be less likely to enter the
construction industry at that point in time.
Following 1982 the trend reversed. New businesses again
started entering into construction in larger numbers. Again this
is consistent with the overall condition of the industry. The
prospects for success with more construction activity and lower
interest rates would seem to be greater.
Comparing indexed values of new business activity and
failure rate also shows some interesting points. This
presentation is shown in Figure 4.13. Both 1978 and 1985 have
bee indexed at 100. The 1985 value of 100 was used to eliminate
the effects of the revised definition of a new business.
If logical tendencies prevailed the two curves should rise
and fall together. This obviously is not the case for the period
1979-1982. Reductions in new businesses were associated with
rises in failure rate.
Following 1982 however, the trends of the two curves are
similar. The rises in new businesses have corresponding rises in
failure rate. In fact since construction activity, loan interest
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rates and construction cost can't explain the rises in failure
rate from 1982-1984, and its continued high values, it appears
that only new business activity can explain these trends.
Therefore the fact that the failure rate has not fallen
dramatically after increases in construction activity and
decreases in interest rates, implies new business activity and
failure of new businesses may be maintaining the high rate.
To investigate this possibility another statistic kept by
Dun and Bradstreet can be introduced. This statistic is the
percent of failures attributable to businesses of a given age.
Three different years are to be compared to show the
influence of new businesses in maintaining the high failure rate.
These years correspond to critical periods in the change of new
business activity over 1978-1986. 1978 was chosen since after
that year new businesses started to fall dramatically. 1982 was
the year which had almost the lowest number of new businesses and
marked the point when new business activity increased. 1986
shows the most recent status of activity.
Figure 4.14 shows the percent failing for ages from 1 year
to 10 years for 1986. This figure shows the influence of recent
new businesses activity to the failures experienced in 1986.
About 1/3 of all failure are accounted for in businesses 3 years
old or less. In addition over 7.5% of the failures were caused
by businesses in their 1st year.
Figure 4.15 as a contrast shows the percent of failures per





















































than for 1986. Only 2.2% of the failures were from companies
less than one year old and less than 15% of failures were from
companies less than 3 years old. The significance of new
businesses on the failure rate during this period clearly is not
what is was in 1986.
Figure 4.16 shows the same graph for 1978. Even though new
business activity was as great in 1978 as it was in 1986, the
impact of the new businesses on failures in 1978 was not as
significant. Less than 1% of the failures were by companies in
their first year. The failures in the second, third, and fourth
years however picked up tremendously.
A possible explanation of this is that companies were less
anxious to go the route of bankruptcy and failure in 1978.
Companies would rather continue unproductive businesses for
another year before succumbing to failure. The advantages of
bankruptcy due to the latest laws were not in effect so companies
were not as anxious to have the courts settle their fate. As the
laws have been slackened and the stigma of bankruptcy has waned
companies are more likely to enter bankruptcy earlier. This is
one possible explanation of why the age of failure in 1978 would
be greater than 1986 even though new business activity and
economic conditions were similar.
For clarity the three years are combined on Figure 4.17 to
demonstrate their relationship. It is important to note that
1982 had by far the largest percent of failures for companies
over 10 years old. In general the age of failure was greater
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during that period. This can partially be explained by the fewer
number of new businesses entering at that time, but another
explanation is relevant.
That period was the end of a long spell of low construction
activity and high interest rates. It demonstrates the impact
continuing poor economic conditions can have on established
businesses. Although established businesses can handle some
adversity, continued poor economic conditions will cause failure
in weak established businesses. As a contrast, relatively good
economic conditions in 1986 result in failures occurring in much
younger businesses.
Since the percent of failures for 1986 for young companies
was extraordinarily high, the impact of new businesses on the
failure rate is even more significant in this period. Not only
did the number of new businesses increase from 1982-1986 but the
likelihood of them failing increased also. Their impact on
maintaining a high failure rate is the result.
Another significant way of looking at this issue is to view
the rate of failure for young businesses. In 1982 the greatest
likelihood of failure may not have been until that company was
five years old. In 1986 by far the greatest likelihood is in the
first three years. The failure rate for a construction company
three years old or less is substantially greater than the 107 per
10,000 average. Once a company is older than three years





The characteristics of the failure rate over the period
1978-1986 are complex. it is clear that no one factor can
account for the variations experienced. Rather it would appear
that construction failure rate is a function of several factors.
The failure rate curve had several interesting periods. The
dramatic rise from 1979-1982 is certainly one. This rise can be
attributed to extremely low construction activity, high interest
rates, high mortgage rates, and possibly high inflation.
The slight increase from 1982-1983 and the dramatic increase
from 1983-1984 can not be explained with the same variables. The
increase in construction activity and decrease in interest rates
would suggest a reduction in failure rate. The increase can be
explained by the increase in new businesses entering the
construction industry.
The continued high rate of failure, although slightly
declining from 1984-1986, also is contrary to what indicators
would suggest. Interest rates continued to fall and construction
activity increased although at a slower pace than previous years.
The lack of fall in the failure rate can be explained by the
relatively high rate at which new businesses are entering
construction and the high percentage of failure in these new
businesses. The overall trend of a lower age at failure is




Another issue which must be stated is the possible impact of
looser bankruptcy laws on the failure rate in general. While it
is not possible to obtain concrete evidence on the impact of the
realization among companies that bankruptcy has new advantages,
it is suspected that the new laws have increased the speed at
which companies declare bankruptcy and probably the amount that
seek bankruptcy also. It is also suspected that this reasoning
can not explain the entire growth of the failure rate in




MODELING OF BUSINESS FAILURE RATE AND BANKRUPTCY
IN THE CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
Introduction
The past influence of various economic factors on the
construction business failure rate was investigated in Chapter 4.
These factors can not only be used to explain past performance
but also to predict future tendencies and changes. The use and
development of a mathematical model to predict future failure
rates will be explored based on factors previously presented.
Modeling of bankruptcy tendency can also be applied to
individual companies rather than the industry as a whole. This
chapter will also explore the applicability of models in
determining the prospect of failure for construction companies.
The analysis will introduce and use existing models developed
outside the construction industry and analyze their usefulness in
determining failure probability for construction companies.
Macro-Economic Modeling
Methodology
To model the overall prospect of failure in the construction
industry the overall external factors in which construction
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companies exist must be used. The model to be presented will
employ as variables the industry indicators developed in Chapter
4. They include:
1) as a measure of interest rates: the Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank Loan Rate
2) as a measure of construction activity: the
Construction Contract Valuation Index by F.W. Dodge
3) as a measure of interest rates and residential
construction activity: the new first home
conventional mortgage rate
4) as a measure of inflation: the Department of
Commerce's construction cost index
5) as a measure of new business activity: the number of
yearly businesses starts from Dun and Bradstreet.
These variables have a significant range in values. To
eliminate the effect of variable range, the change in variable
was used for modeling. The overall form of the model was
therefore:
^failure rate = C AX + C aX +...+ C AX + C
ij 1 lij 2 2ij n nij n+1
where: A failure rate = the change in failure rate from
ij
year i to year j
,
C = a modeling coefficient,
n
Ax = the change in variable X from year i to
nij
year j with the variable being the five listed above.
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The objective of the model can be thought of as determining
which variables contribute to the change in failure rate and to
what degree they contribute. To perform the analysis of the
model and determine coefficients, multiple linear regression was
used. Multiple regression analysis is a process which finds the
best fit coefficients for a series of independent variables set
equal to one dependant variable. As a by-product of multiple
regression analysis the significance of the combination of
variable as well as the significance of individual variables can
be determined.
Using this processes therefore the five variable thought to
have a possible influence on failure rate can be used in various
combinations to determine the best combination. The relative
coefficients will be determined as well as the influence of
individual variables on failure rate.
The multiple regression analysis for this model was
performed on a Macintosh computer. In particular the program
Statview was used. This allowed the rapid analysis of various
combinations of variables.
There are two significance tests for multiple linear
regression. The first is a test for the significance of
regression. This test determines if there is a relationship
using the combination of variables employed and the dependant
variable. The test also determines the significance of the
relationship so that different alternatives can be compared to
determined which provides a better modeling of the dependant
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variable. The test for significance of regression uses the
hypotheses:
Ho: all coefficient are zero and
HI: at least one coefficient is not zero.
The test is made using an F statistic calculated by dividing
the mean square of regression by the mean square of error. The
hypothesis that all coefficients are zero can be rejected if:
Fo > Fc<,k,n-k-l
where: alpha is a measure of the significance of the
relationship,
k = degrees of freedom of regression,
n-k-1 = degrees of freedom of error.
If Ho is rejected at least one of the independent variables
contributes significantly to the model. The larger Fo is the
greater the significance of the model is.
The second test for significance is on individual variables.
This test is to determine the usefulness of individual variables
on the whole model. The hypotheses for the test are:
Ho: the coefficient for the variable is zero
HI: the coefficient is not zero.
If Ho is rejected the variable contributes significantly to the
model. Ho can be rejected if:
t > t^
o /2, n-k-1
where: alpha defines the significance,
n-k-1 = the degrees of freedom of error.
The values of percent change for the variables applied to
73

the model are listed in Appendix B. The values for changes
between 1984 and 1985 had to be omitted since the change of new
construction businesses can not be calculated. The definition of
a new business was changed in 1985 so the 1985 value can not be
compared with 1984 's value. The changes between the remaining
years from 1978-1986 were used to develop the model. All values
used were percents.
Analysis of Results
The multiple regression analysis performed generated the
following model as the best predictor of change in construction
business failure rate:
change in failure rate = 2.1 (change in new business) + 1.8 (change
in Fed. Int. Bank Loan Rate) - 3.9
(change in contract value index) + 44.8
Figure 5.1 shows the output for the regression analysis for these
three variables. Figure 5.1 is separated into three parts. The
first part shows the significance for the three variables in
combination and the degrees of freedom for the test. The second
part shows the actual values calculated by the regression
analysis and also the t values used to determine if individual
variables are significant. The third section shows variable
values for different confidence intervals. The significance test
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REGRESSION RESULTS FOP NEW BUSINESSES, CONTRACT VALUE AND LOAN RATE
DF. R.
Regression Yi :FAILURES 3 X variables
R-squared. Adj. R-iqu4ri?d. Std. Error.
6 !.994 1.937 !6,102
Source DF:
An^alysis of Variance Table






8692.203 2897.401 1 77.82
RESIDUAL |3 1 1 1 .697 37.232 1 p = .uu.i.4
TOTAL 6 |SS03.9
No Residual Statistics Cornputed
sing values.
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Multiple Regression Yi :FAILURES 3 X variables
Conndence intervals and Partial F Table
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for the three variables in combination results in:
F = 77.82
o
F > F for alpha =0.1 F =29.46
o ^,k,n-k-l 0.1;3,3
The significance tests for individual variables:
for contract value index, t = 12.385
for new businesses, t = 10.488
for fed. int. loan rate, t = 7.258
for alpha = 0.01, t,^ = 5.841
/2,n-k-l
Therefore all three variables are significant and their
combination is significant.
Not only does the model make sense statistically it also
makes sense logically. The negative coefficient for contract
value index indicates decreases in construction activity increase
failure rate. Both of the other variables have positive
coefficients so increases in loan interest rates and new
businesses increase failure rate.
Since contracts value index had the largest coefficient,
this model indicates that changes in that variable effect failure
rate the most. Both new business activity and loan rate change
are about equal in their influence.
The printouts of the other regression analyses performed
using different combinations of variables are contained in
Appendix B. From the other runs performed it is clear that the
variables in the final model are by far the best predictors of
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construction failure rate change.
First it is clear that two variables alone can not predict
failure rate change. All runs with two variables had F test
values less than seven which means a low significance of
prediction. Even the analysis of mortgage rates (which to some
extent measures both interest rates and residential construction
activity) and new business activity resulted in an F test value
of less than three.
From the sequence of different analyses it is also clear
that change in construction cost is not an indicator of change in
failure rate. This confirms what was suspected in Chapter 4 with
the graph of both failure rate and construction cost using a
similar index value. All runs with construction cost resulted in
lower F test values than if construction cost was omitted. In
addition the t values for construction cost always indicated
construction cost was not a significant predictor of failure
rate.
The change in federal intermediate credit bank loan rate
turned out to be a better predictor of failure rate than mortgage
rates. This should be expected since it should more closely
indicate the loan rate being paid by construction companies.
A final point about the collection of analyses run on the
variables is that there was no evidence of a time lag between the
variables and failure rate change. One year time lags for the
variable loan rate, mortgage rate, and new businesses were
attempted but they all resulted in very low F values. From this
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it should not be concluded that no time lag exists between
variable changes and failure rate changes, rather it only appears
that the time lag is not one year.
Additional research into the possibility of lags that are
represented by months not years is needed. This research can be
conducted similarly to the analysis for this paper only monthly
changes in variables should be used. Another possibility that is
suggested by the information in Chapter 4 is that time lags only
occur in changes which increase failure rate. In other words it
takes a period of time for negative influences to manifest
themselves in failure rate increases. If conditions improve
however, failure rate may fall with little or no time difference.
Again additional research is needed to analyze this possibility.
Model Limitations
The model should not be taken as an absolute indicator of
changes in construction failure rate. The statistical analysis
shows, as would be expected, there is not a complete correlation.
In addition to the possibility of some time lag other factors may
be effecting the model.
The possible impact of the new bankruptcy law certainly is
not accounted for in the model. The possibility of more
companies seeking bankruptcy protection due to legal advantages
and the possibility of a stronger company after reorganization




Another impact on the model was the lack of knowledge of new
business activity from 1984-1985. Since Dun and Bradstreet
revised their definition of a new business in 1985 the change in
new businesses from 1984-1985 as well as change in all other
variables had to be omitted. The model therefore does not
reflect changes between 1984-1985.
The most significant limitation of the model is that the
model is only for a given period of time. It is uncertain how
the model would perform in other periods. The model should be
analyzed with future values to determine its adequacy and to
update its coefficients.
Modeling of Company Bankruptcy Tendency
A distinct and different modeling technique from that
presented so far can be applied to characteristics of individual
companies to determine their likelihood of bankruptcy. Modeling
of this nature has been performed on different company groupings
but never strictly for construction companies in the United
States. A model was developed in Great Britain for construction
companies. Mr. Franco Abbinante discussed the applicability of
that model to U.S. construction firms in his Special Research
paper. (Abbinante 1987)
Modeling of bankruptcy tendency for companies uses
traditional financial ratio analysis. The values of these
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financial ratios for a group of companies which have gone
bankrupt and a group which have not are gathered. A statistical
analysis is performed on these ratios to determine which are
relevant to the fact that certain companies went bankrupt while
others did not. A model describing the tendency of these
companies toward bankruptcy is then developed.
Traditional financial ratios take items from company balance
sheets and income statements. These ratios allow the company to
be compared against other similar companies. Also a company's
progress can be tracked by looking at the change in these ratios
over time.
Financial ratios can be separated into four categories:
1) liquidity ratios are a measurement of current asset
to current liabilities which can also be viewed as a likelihood
of technical insolvency
2) leverage ratios are a measurement of the debt of a
company compared to other aspects of the company
3) activity ratios are a measurement of the revenues
generated by the company for given assets or other aspects of the
company
4) profitability ratios are a measurement of profit to
other company characteristics like assets or revenues. (Halpin
1985)
Financial ratios cover all aspects of a company's condition.
The proper use of financial ratios can therefore give a good





A pioneer in the field of predicting business bankruptcy is
Edward Altman. In the late 1960 's he developed a model for
predicting bankruptcy tendency using a sample of 66 manufacturing
companies. Half fo these companies had gone bankrupt. By
analyzing different financial ratios of the 66 firms he developed
a model which would fairly well distinguish between which of the
66 went bankrupt and which did not. He called this model the
z-score model and its form was:
Z = 0.012A + 0.014B + 0.033C + 0.006D + 0.999E
Where: A = working capital/total assets
B = retained earnings/total assets
C = earnings before interest and taxes/total
assets
D = market value of equity/book value of total
liabilities
E = sales/total assets
Note the financial ratios that comprise the model cover all
aspects of the company:
A measures the liquidity of the company
B measures the financial reserves of the company and to
some degree indicates that younger firms without time to build
high retained earnings will be more likely to fail
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C measures the productivity of the company's assets
D is an indirect measurement of how much a firm's
assets can decline in value before liabilities exceed assets and
insolvency occurs.
E is an activity ratio or a capital turnover ratio
indicating the firm's sales generating capability for given
assets. (Altman 1983)
When presented this model was shown to be a good indicator
of bankruptcy tendency within 2 or 3 years from the time for
analysis. Using the model if the z-score calculated was less
than 1.81 this meant the company was going to go bankrupt. Z-
Scores greater than 2.99 meant the company was not going to go
bankrupt. If the z-score was between 1.81 and 2.99, the
bankruptcy tendency of the company was unclear.
Z-Score Modeling and Construction Companies
The z-score model was developed from companies which were
not involved with construction. The group of companies used to
develop the model were fairly consistent in size. No firm with
assets lower than $1 million was used and no firm with assets
greater than $25 million was used. In addition as the ratios
chosen suggest, all companies were public.
The applicability of this model to construction companies is
therefore unclear. To analyze how this model perform with
construction companies, seven companies who are involved with
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These firms are not solely involved in construction. At
worst however, they have subsidiaries who are some of the largest
construction companies in the U.S. The construction portion of
all of these companies is significant to the total business of
that firm. All of the firms however exceed the upper limit on
assets used when the z-score model was developed.
The primary reason these companies were chosen is that the
data required for using the z-score model was readily available
through Moody' Industrial Manual. All of the data used was from
1985 balance sheets and income statements.
A computer program in BASIC was developed to calculate the
z-score for companies. That program as well as the printouts of
runs calculating the z-score of the seven companies is contained
in Appendix C. A summery of the z-scores is shown in Figure 5.2.
From Figure 5.2 it is clear that the z-score model predicts
bankruptcy for Turner Corp. and Flour Corp. sometime before 1988.
The bankruptcy prospects for Blount Inter, and Dravo are unclear.
Only Halliburton, Morrison Knudsen and Perini are clearly not
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facing possible bankruptcy in the near future.
Based on these results the applicability of Altman's z-score
modeling for construction related firms is suspect. All of these
companies have significant financial reserves and are leaders in
their field. Predicting only three of the seven are secure from
bankruptcy in the very near future does not seem accurate.
The model may be more applicable to construction firms with
assets in the range for which the model was developed. Obtaining
the data necessary to conduct this analysis is difficult. Not
only are there few companies who would fit into this category,
their balance sheets and income statements are not in general
published.
The fact this model is strictly for public companies and
larger established firms indicates it may not be appropriate for
analyzing and avoiding problems in the construction industry
anyway. As noted in Chapter 4 the most significant class of
failures in construction is small, extremely young companies.
Altman's z-score by its very nature is not applicable to
companies in that category.
Edmister's Small Business Model
R. Edmister applied the technique of financial ratio
modeling to determine the failure probability in small
businesses. The population for Edmister's study was exclusively
firms with loans from the Small Business Administration. Using
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zero-one linear regression Edmister developed the following
model
:
Z = 0.951 - 0.423A - 0.293B - 0.482C + 0.277D - 0.452E -
0.352F - 0.924G
where: A is the ratio of annual funds flow to current
liabilities. It equals one if the ratio is less then
0.05, zero otherwise,
B is the ratio of equity to sales. It equals one if the
ratio is less then .07, zero otherwise,
C is the ratio of net working capital to sales divided
by the corresponding Robert Morris Assoc. (RMA) average
ratio. It equals one if the ratio is less than -0.02,
zero otherwise,
D is the ratio of current liabilities to equity divided
by the corresponding RMA average ratio. It equals one
if less than 0.48, zero otherwise,
E is the ratio of inventory to sales divided by the
corresponding RMA industry average. It equals one if
the ratio has shown an upward trend, zero otherwise,
F is the quick ratio divided by the trend in RMA quick
ratio. It equals one if the trend is downward and the
level prior to receiving the SEA loan is less than
0.34, zero otherwise,
G is the quick ratio divided by RMA quick ratio. It
equals one if the ratio has shown an upward trend, zero
otherwise.
Using the failure criteria, if Z > 0.53 the company would not
fail and if Z < 0.53 failure occurs, the model predicted all of
the failures and 86% of the non-failures. (Altman 1983)
Again the applicability of Edmister 's model to small
construction companies can not be analyzed due to the lack of
financial information from small construction companies. A model
designed for small businesses is inherently more applicable to
construction since the vast majority of companies and companies
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that fail fall into that category.
Edmister's model does give some insight into what is
important to determining failure in small businesses. Four of
the seven variables in his model deal with current liabilities
either by itself our as part of the quick ratio. Maintaining a
good control over the extent of current liabilities and insuring
sufficient liquid assets are on hand to cover the liabilities
seems to be the most important factor. Note that this contrasts
with Altman's model for larger public companies where current
liabilities are only a part of one of the five variables he uses.
The ideal analysis for determining what is important for
small construction companies would be to develop a model strictly
for small construction company failures. This model would
require accurate financial statements from a large group of
bankrupt and non-bankrupt construction companies. Obtaining this
information is not simple and would require the support of a
lending institution or bonding company. The result of the study
would determine which financial ratios are significant to small
construction companies. It can not be accurately stated that all
of the ratios in Edmister's model especially inventory to sales
are the most significant to construction companies.
The use of Edmister's model is a starting point however.
The use of it rather than the z-score model developed by Altman
would apply to the vast majority of construction companies and




SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Summary
Bankruptcy and business failure is an extremely disruptive
force in the construction industry. A project encountering a
bankrupt contractor will suffer in completion time, quality and
cost.
To avoid this possibility an owner must adequately screen
possible contractors. Bonding must be used to minimize the
possible effects of a bankrupt contractor.
Construction companies themselves must always be cognizant
of the possibility of business failure. Constant monitoring of
their financial condition through the use of financial ratios is
key. Overall industry indicators must also be monitored and
trends analyzed to determine swings in failure probabilities.
It is clear that the chance of failure for a construction
company has increased significantly over the past ten years. A
possible factor in the increase is bankruptcy laws have become
more lenient. Consequently the protection afforded debtors by
law may be very appealing. A contractor who once may have
attempted to cancel debts without the use of bankruptcy is more
likely to choose the bankruptcy route now.
The prospect of reorganization through bankruptcy courts
certainly has its advantages for companies burdened with large
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unmanageable debts. Bankruptcy can be a way of sheading the debt
while leaving behind the main causes of the debt through
reorganization. Alleviation from unwanted union agreements and
of poor management are two key areas when the reorganization
route is considered.
Although precise causes of bankruptcy and failure are hard
to define, most are related to financial management problems.
Construction's reliance on a cash-flow cycle for each project
with negative cash-flows occurring at the start of most projects
makes financial management a prime concern. Construction
companies capable of properly managing money and keeping close
tabs on cost control are at an advantage. Companies must
constantly strive to do things quicker and more efficiently since
overall labor cost is a prime difference between individual
contractors.
From a macro-economic standpoint the rate of failure in
construction is related to the amount of construction activity,
loan interest rates, and the number of new businesses entering
construction. It appears that construction has reached its
saturation point as far as number of companies goes. New
business activity has been relatively high in the recent past
however it is primarily the new businesses which have been
failing.
A company desiring to enter the construction field now must
be very certain that a market exists for his business. In
addition to be technically competent, he must have a fair amount
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of business savvy. Insuring the growth of the company does not
exceed the company's capacity is of prime importance. Small
business failure models indicate high current liabilities
relative to current assets is the one key indicator of failure.
A new business must be cautious of its first 3-5 years of
operation. Failure rate in that time is by far the greatest.
A company must also be aware that avoiding failure does not
ensure success. It is suspected that many more companies exit
the construction field due to lack of success than because of
failure. To succeed, a company must not only avoid failure by
remaining solvent it must earn enough profit to help the company




From this research the following has been concluded:
1) The number of yearly failures in the construction
industry according to Dun and Bradstreet have risen 484% from
1978-1986. A more accurate portrayal of the status of the
construction industry is through the use of failure rate. This
statistic has risen from 22 per 10,000 to 107 per 10,000 or an
increase of 386% from 1978-1986.
2) The sharp rise in failure rate from 1979-1982 can be
attributed to low construction activity and high interest rates.
With construction activity increasing and interest rates falling
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between 1982 and 1986, the construction failure rate has remained
high due to new businesses.
3) In the last five years the average age of a construction
company at failure has been declining. The higher age at failure
five years ago is indicative of the effect bad economic times
have on all companies even established firms. Older firms can
weather some adversity but continued slow activity and high
interest rates ultimately have their effect. As a contrast,
recently the age at failure has been declining which indicates
the companies which are failing are in general small,
unexperienced companies who are unable to get a foot hold in a
tight competitive construction industry. The most difficult time
for a new company is now the first three years. After that time
the probability of failure starts to drop.
4) Although the failure rate for construction companies is
extremely high when compared with the last forty years, it is
below the failure rate for all businesses. Construction is by no
means alone in problems with company failures.
5) Using data from the past ten years and multiple
regression a mathematical model to predict changes in
construction failure rate was made. The expression which by far
was the best predictor of failure rate change was:
change in failure rate = 2.1 (change in new businesses) + 1.8
(
change in Fed. Inter. Credit Bank Loan




For this model, construction cost changes were not a good
indicator of failure rate changes suggesting inflation may only
be important for its effects on other industry indicators like
interest rates. The model could not incorporate possible effects
new laws have on bankruptcy and failure rate. The modeling
process gave no indication of time lags between variable changes
and failure rate changes. Since all changes were in yearly
increments the only conclusion is that time lags of one year do
not exist. This model can assist companies in determining when
failure rates will be high so management decisions can be made
which will lower a businesses chance of failure. This model also
demonstrates the impact new businesses have on failure rate. At
first glance it would appear that 1986 would be a good year for a
company to enter into the construction field; construction
activity is high and interest rates are low. Due to the
relatively high number of companies entering construction however
the rate of failure is extremely high because of the high amount
of competition especially for younger companies. Prosective
business owners must be aware of the possibility of failure and
realize the factors which affect its change. The model presented
will assist in that effort.
6) The applicability of models which use financial ratios to
predict future failure prospects for individual companies, to
construction companies is suspect. The models have been
developed from companies unrelated to construction and have
specific target groups. Altman's z-score model appears to be
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overly pessimistic when it applied to seven large, public,
construction related firms. The suspected lack of applicability-
may be due to the companies tested being larger than the
companies used to develop the model or may be due to the fact
that the companies are construction not manufacturing related.
Recommendations for Further Research
Further research is needed in the following areas:
1) The model which was developed to determine changes in
failure rate for construction based on industry indicators should
be updated and tested for accuracy in the coming years. With
only the changes in variables for eight years of data available
the model should be fine turned and the coefficients updated when
additional information is available.
2) The model should also be broken down into monthly
increments. This will indicate whether or not time lags between
variable changes and failure rate change of less than one year
are present. This will also result in a more accurate model.
3) Further investigation into the applicability of models
which predict bankruptcy tendency for individual companies is
needed. This is particularly true for models based on small
businesses. Since the majority of construction failures are
small businesses this will result in the most benefit to the
industry. To perform this analysis accurate information on small
private companies is needed. This is certainly the most
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difficult step in the process.
4) If it is found that existing models are not good
predictors of bankruptcy for small construction companies, a
model specifically for construction companies should be
developed. The difficulty making this model is similar to
testing existing models only more acute. Not only does financial
information from existing companies have to be obtained but also
financial information from similar companies who have recently
gone bankrupt is needed. Under existing procedures of bankruptcy
courts this step is nearly impossible. The entire project would
require the assistance of organizations like the Small Businesses
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DATA USED IN MODELING FAILURE RATE AND
PRINTOUTS OF STATISTICAL ANALYSES
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FAILURES NEW BUSINESSES MORTGAGE RATE CONST. COST INDEX
-9.09 -35.51 12.69 20.'c:5
100.00 -17.19 16.89 11.34
50.00 -1.13 15.67 6.00
30.00 -4.33 2.26 1.45
1.2S 40. IS -16.43 2.08

















WITH LOAN RATE SHIFTED OrC YEAR













Source DP: Sura Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSION 3 6970.304 2323.435 7.389
RESIDUAL n 628.882 314.441 p = .1215
TOTAL 5 7599.186
No Residual StatisticsZomputed
Note: 3 cases deleted with aiissing values.
Multiple Regression Yi:FAILW?£S 3 X variables
Beta CoeHicientTable
Parameter : Val ue
:
Std. Err.: Std. Value: t-Value: Probability
INTERCEPT 61.221
CONTRACTS V
-4.326 .985 -1.319 4.393 .0481
NEW BUSINESSES 1.04 .446 .686 2.331 .145
FED. INTER. CR
-.168 .596 -.079 .281 .8054
Multiple Regression Y
i :FAI LURES 3 X variables
araaeter: 95* Lower: 95:: U
INTERCEPT
CONTRACTS V -8.563 -.089
NEW BUSINESSES -.88 2.96
FED. INTER. CR -2.742 2.406
Confidence Intervalsand Partial F Table













WITH MORT RATE AND LOAN RATE AND NEW BUS.. CONTRACT VALUE
Multiple Regr f 55 ion YpFAILURES 4 X variabl es








Source DF: Sum Squares
:
Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSION 4 8729.639 2182.41 58.776
RESIDUAL 2 74.261 37.131 p = .0168
TOTAL 6 8803.9
No Residual Statisticslomputed
Note: 2 cases deleted Mith (Hissing values.





Value: Std. Err.: Std. Value: t-Value: Probabi ity
INTERt:EPT 44.488
CONTRACTS V -3.729 .363 -1.058 10.265 .0094
NEW BUSINESSES 2.027 .216 1.243 9.378 .0112
FED. INTER. CR 1.362 .503 .62 2.708 .1136
MORTGAGE RATE .587 .585 .205 1.004 .4211
Multiple Regression YpFAILURES 4 X variables










Confidence Intervalsand Partial F Table
952 Upper: 90 2 Lower: 90 2 Upper; Partial F:
-2.166 -4.789 -2.668 105.38
2.957 1.396 2.658 87.938
3.525 -.107 2.83 7.334
3.104 -1.121 2.295 1.008
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WITH MORTGAGE RATE , NEW BUS .. CONTRACT VALUE


































Note: 2 cases deletedNith oiissinq values.
Multiple Regression Y
i :FAILW?ES 3 X variables
Beta CoefficientTable




.592 -.95 5.664 .0109
NEW BUSUCSSES 1.652 .293 1.013 5.639 .011
MORTGAGE RATE 1.965 .508 .688 3.866 .0306
Multiple Regression Yi:FAILUR£S 3 X variables
Confidence Interval sand Partial F Table




90 : Lower: 90 2 Upper: Partial
INTERCEPT
CONTRACTS V
-5.234 -1.468 -4.743 -1.959 32.085
NEW BUSINESSES .72 2.585 .963 2.342 31.803
MORTGAGE RATE .347 3.584 .769 3.162 14.943
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WITH MORTGAGE RATE SHIFTED ONE YEAR













Source DF: Sun) Squares
:
Mean Square: F-test:
REGRESSION 3 7015.323 2338.441 8.01
RESIDUAL 2 583.863 291.932 p= .113
TOTAL 5 7599.186
No Residua! Stati5tics3oaiputed
Note: 3 cases deleted with missing values.
Multiple Regression Yi:FAILURES 3 X variables
Beta Coeff icientTable
Parameter: Value: Std. Err.: Std. Value: t-Value: Probability
INTERCEPT 61 .948
CONTRACTS V -4.349
.916 -1.326 4.746 .0416
NEW BUSINESSES 1.066 .408 .702 2.614 .1205
MORTGAGE RATE -.334
.683 -.106 .489 .6733
Multiple Regression Y
i
:FAILURES 3 X variables
Confidence Interval sand Partial F Table
Parameter : 95i[ Lower
:
952 Upper: 90 2 Lower: 90 2 Upper: Partial
INTERCEPT
CONTRACTS V -8.292 -.406 -7.025 -1.673 22.523
NEW BUSINESSES -.688 2.819 -.125 2.256 6.834
MORTGAGE RATE -3.27 2.603 -2.327 1.659 .239
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WITH NEW BUS. SHIFTED ONE YEAR, LOAN RATE .CONTRACT VALUE







4 .962 .926 .703 19.657
Ana lysis of Variance Table
Source DF: Sua Squares: Mean Square; F-test:
REGRESSION 3 4809.697 1603.232 4.149 b
RESIDUAL 1 386.414 386.414 p = .3429
TOTAL 4 5196.111
No Residual StatisticsZomputed
Note: 4 cases deleted with aissinQ values.
Multiple Regression YpFAILURES 3 X variables
Beta CoefficientTable
Parameter : Val ue
:
Std. Err.: Std. Value: t-Value: Probability
INTERCEPT 47.125
CONTRACTS V
-1.289 1.426 -.474 .904 .5321
NEW BUSINESSES
-.121
.407 -.094 .297 .8162
FED. INTER. CR 1.022 1.017 .488 1.006 .4982
Multiple Regression Y
i :FAILUR£S 3 X variables
Confidence Intervalsand Partial F Table
Paraaeter : 9511; LoHer
:
95: Upper: 90 2 Lower: 90 : Upper: Partial
F
INTERCEPT
CONTRACTS V -19.411 16.833 -10.294 7.716 .817
NEW BUSINESSES
-5.296 5.054 -2.693 2.451 .088
FED. INTER. CR
-11.896 13.941 -5.397 7.442 1.011
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Ad-j . R-sguared : Std . Error
:
.963 7.345
Analvsis oi Variance Table
Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
8695.994 2173.999 40.294
107.906 53.953 p = .0244
8803.9
No Residual StatisticsZoaiputed
Note: 2 cases deleted with niissinq values.
Multiple Regression Y
i




Value: Std. Err.: Std. Value: t-Value: Probability
INTERCEPT 43.679
CONTRACTS V -4.002 .516 -1.135 7.763 .0162
NEW BUSINESSES 2.166" .326 1.328 6.641 .0219
FED. INTER. CR 1 .743 .371 .794 4.699 .0424
CONST. COST I .28 1.057 .05 .265 .8158
Multiple Regression Y
i :FAI LURES 4 X variables




FED. INTER. CR .147
CONST. COST I
-4.266
Confidence Intervalsand Partial F Table
952 Upper: 90 2 Lower: 90 2 Upper; Partial F;
-1.784 -5.507 -2.497 60.262
3.568 1.213 3.118 44.106
3.339 .66 2.S26 22.085
4.826 -2.805 3.365 .07
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WITH NEW BUS. AND .CONTRACT VALUE










Adj . R-squared : Std . Error
i
.765 .647 22.765
Analysis of Variance Table











Note: 2 cases deleted with missing values.
Kultiple Recession YpFAILURES 2 X variables
Beta CoefficientTable
Paraseter: Value: Std. Err.: Std. Value: t-Value: Probability
INTERCEPT 53.182
CONTRACTS V
-4.168 1.17 -1.182 3.562 .0235
NEI"! BUSINESSES 1.098 .541 .674 2,029 .1123
Multiple Regression Y i :FAILURES 2 X variables
Confidence Intervalsand Partial F Table
Parameter : 9Z'i Lower
:
95'^ Upper: 90:: Lower: 90 Z Upper: Partial
INTERCEPT
CONTRACTS V
-7.4ie -.919 -6.663 -1 .673 12.687
NEW BUSINESSES
-.405 2.601 -.056 2.252 4.118
110

WITH LOAN RATE AND . CONTRACT VALUE
DF:
Multiple Regression YpFAILURES 2 X variables





Note: 2 cases deleted with missinq values.
32.43
Anal vsis 0^ Variance Table
Source DF: Sum Squares: Mean Square: F-test:
R-EGfESSION 4597.03 2298.515 2.185
RESIDUAL 4 4206 .67 1051.718 p= .2283
TOTAL 6 8803.9








FED. INTER. CR 3,073E-4
Beta Coeff icientTable
Std. Err.: Std. Value: t-Value: Probabi ity
1.529 -.723 1.666 .1711
.952 I .400E-4 3.228E-4 .9998






Confidence Intervalsand Partial F Table










WITH LOAN RATE AND .NEW BUSINESSEE













Source DF: Sura Squares
:
Mean Squar-e: F-test:
REGRESSION 2 2981 .255 1490.628 1.024
RESIDUAL 4 5022.645 1455.661 p = .4374
TOTAL b 8803.9
No Residual StatisticsZomputed
Note: 2 cases deleted with uissinq values.
Multiple Regression Y
i
:FAILURES 2 X variables
Beta CoefficientTable
Parameter: Value: Std. Err.: Std. Value: t-Value: ProbaDihtv:
INTERCEPT 21 .723
FED. INTER. CR 2.148 1.542 .978 1.393 ,236
NEW BUSINESSES 1.063 1.145 .664 .946 .3977







Confidence Interval sand Partial F Table




















K.'itipie Rfveisar. "Mi'aILUREc 3 X vi'.abUi
Multiple Regression Y














.MT "^ilE MAi-^r-. M, r-Al, (
"\[.l i-'i-
•M-'^-.i., 'El
rnMP^M^- 5 PE >
-
,i U 1
uf 1. r. . f
.
MT '-TliE CGM-VlMY >:.
I-: -TiiE ro..!PA:sV-E

















. V V i.\ I
/I i' V ''' 'i +






•. |,i Ti-i*-- r^P'^ "! "> '
1PPE
,-1 iF' 1 !..„ Y .1 1 . II
I
'
,,.: PI ij:; -T I.
r E ')' If
1 ., j' * i ->• 4 i' i i
i, s A )k i * >! ^ ^ ^^ +
'^ *
• i ?(: i » '; 4 :< *
I k i- . i i i ^^ ^ ^^ ^^










;• \j f : I FT
^i^^ EPPTPT "
. Pt--IF!T '^ "
lP^-t:p> " '





,.;1 i. VA!-'Jt:.b i--^- -
UTThL AP£E3T'3 APE'P
|...uii L F'F
1. 'i i 1 -t ^ "*
nni 1.h1-..:j
trApPlFW33 EEPQi
FPTA -ImPP' Eh- ii
















TiJP L A'-''I '• i-ii

A n T r-- (.jUTT! '^r'i't








v. i ^. i: ;Jr 4: ;!• ;.'* .>. ,i i: '}. '^.
:; i 4 i f ;! 't * ?(: i- f r t. s - : V t ' i^ t i- • t ^
a;.. as^:eS'5 ape 6'^'r"2^
.. .
i-' I h 'L
' C AF-' I T n. T b '' '5c 1 Q
:irr II4GG E-E!"DRE ^isTEPES- A':D TAXES ARE
'! r :. ! ] E: Ij i£A F- ; AL i ; i: E f .F E :! 1 'JP :: ^






T'EEGFE BLGU'IT^A: bA!4rEliPTr\ TE JE T -:• I II I-
118

V i' I- ! i J ' . •: •.' -i
•T! iprJi:-!":
i 4, / •: s. ^r ii; i V ;!• :;' * >» ;jf :i' w ». >!. y * >i :i: * ^' :;^ i! ;| i T T •" T
TAINED EARMIMGS AF'E 67 j 2-
IK V ' ALUE UF T U T ,-. I. !.. :[ A I'' I L I J I E 3 T S oP 6 <! 9 2
-::^ET V^AL LIE OF EuAITV IE ]0v-.5'z
E CuM'-AN't ' E Z- SCOr^E JG . 4c) j'':'":^''
~
ORE TURNt;;-- rtAE A VERY HIRM CRAilRE T'F i:.i irivi IFI '. '. ; I , L V
REAERNE FOR Ti !E COM- Al i', " E HIG*-! Er iM! T iJF jr^ TEMRANOV Af
I i-^DR!-. ] RR CAR IT A
I
M R!^:tai!!ei;' R,--,n'ii
'• EA'--'bi:v MRR V:Prijr.r
-.' I'i.-R";! ET ^^Y;LU!-- OF






;.: I ; F „
i. i' :" ;!: t i ^ V t i' V' I >i i: y





l"-;-!:.!-iG3 Pi:rnF:E. j.iITF-eet A' u'/ t^i.^
} r-^ ! v A ;... ! jF n i - T' (JTA : .. i ..a m :r i ; i: • • i e: \-
)TAL 3 ALEE; ARA /!- -79-^5
,"
! i •; T c:: T "-i ic fa:-! Tl. J 'I
120

; :V :Tf li- * ;}; ;: i * ;i- ' * h i i-1-
. i -i
,







y^-\\ ! ^i'..!i.. J;;'''-!''!!.'!;;'
I ,A .::a T^ -i .^h4-
!:j''' V-iLUE OF TGfAL L I AB : :.. IT I E£ I ii:
Pi ET -'A'.! IE UF' EGMlTv IS ^!2.:=:!3.2
E: CD;-l-i-i./ :f-:;:;; r
F:EFuRi;-;. h'i jF'F' Q-:- Vi-l.r ;|:.i;p r! Ti-;""
121

:i * s- *
.i H^ i r- i i
Hi IR
vu .i. i. .i 4.. - J -i- i' V * -i^ A i; xi^ ; .^ + 'iV V. .T ; ,T , i 1- t ••! T V T t •; . . T i -T ;f: ^> ¥ 4 ^
.1 hn !_. f-^ ':; - !::, -i 1 5:. H !-: b. :.. / 9 b -j: ii: H-
:J"1.! ! luE BEFGF-'E 1MTEF:E:3T A!^ID '^-\>Z3 Afa:
-
["liilNED Eh,!';!l ] MGS AF^!;':' i7&7Ei
JUf^: N'A:...UE D'- T'JThL L : A& I L I':" I E;-- IE 17 62
61 ::.'?!
-U- ^:f- AF;E -lr:£A-}A
'-nf E ] E 1
REFDF'E FLUL.M-' HAE A \'t:Y-/ HlG-l C!-if,;-JEE OF' t:Ar.li Rii:'-' fC
REAEGM5 FHR THE LOUPAh ij;-;!-! Bfti'iKpiJi:: TF: |vDA[.;CY A!-'!;.
U! i^.!L•'-^ ir:- CAPiTr.!.
L'^' RETT II lEI.' EAR I !1MEE
iW EAENTiMGE BEFORE INTEREE;' f->MD TAXE'
122

PER I MI *
J i :[/ >}f t * >f + 1^ :^^ 1 1 * it 1< :r <• 5}- * ;i * ^' ^ * 1: ^ 1 1 * '^ * 1^- r t {< * * * *
..L VALUES ARE I!i THCU5AMDS
DTAL ASSES'S APE 3225^9
]Rr:il-JE CAPITAL 13 43e:>5
^RMir-JGG BEFORE INTEREST AND TAXES ARE-9a"^7
ITAJMED EARMIM33 ARE 9j351
WK VALUE DP TuTr:.L LIAE-ILITIE^ 13 2l''^^U9
\Fy.EJ VALUE OF EnuiTV IE Q"'1S3
}TAL SALES AFE E10^"'72
iZ lOM^'AN-v tiL-.J'. . 1 BZdSJ
:REF UkE PERI: J J Si-!0'JS MD 3IGlTr UF EANK'PUr^'TO >' IM THE h!E>T TH-'EE VEARi
123

^- * >]f :^ ;i; )t; i * >[; ^: ;{; >fr i f A ^ >; >v :^ jr w j; >ir ^ * Y -^ i ?;; :t t * t t '• :* * ^
DRA'v'O
:t -Jf t * * i t * 1 1 * * * >i; :^ * t '^ -r* * "' t -If t >r * 4^ >!' I' >! 1 1 f^ + ^ *
,L VALUES AF.E IN THDUSAI IDS
TAL A5SE5TS ARE 542C'84
RKING CiAPITAL 13 S''370
RNir^JGS EEFGFE IhlTEREST AND TAXE3 APE 7670
T A I NED EARN I NGS ARE 1 34 S : 4
Dl< VALUE OF TOTAL LIALILITJES li
RKET VALUE OF EQUIT/ 15 19a27'3
^AL SALEE; -'E e?2"'33
E CuMPANi"^ Z-SCuRE 15 2.3;'Q''i23
; n
1 .: '-'u -
•EFORE DRA',-D'3 DhI-U RUP fC^ TE!-;Di-r>'C V Tb UlMCLEAr-;





DTTDLET KFOX LIBRARY -














failure in the construc-
tion industry.

